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SIV: A Structural Integrity Verification Approach of Cloud
Components with Enhanced Privacy
Bo Zhao, Peiru Fan , Pengyuan Zhao, Mingtao Ni, and Jinhui Liu
Abstract: Private data leakage is a threat to current integrity verification schemes of cloud components. To address
this issue, this work proposes a privacy-enhancing Structural Integrity Verification (SIV) approach. It is made up of
three processes: proof organization, proof transformation, and integrity judgement. By introducing a Merkle tree
technique, the integrity of a constituent part of a cloud component on a node is represented by a root value. The
value is then masked to cipher texts in proof transformation. With the masked proofs, a structural feature is extracted
and validated in an integrity judgement by a third-party verification provider. The integrity of the cloud component
is visually displayed in the output result matrix. If there are abnormities, the corrupted constituent parts can be
located. Integrity is verified through the encrypted masked proofs. All raw proofs containing sensitive information
stay on their original nodes, thus minimizing the attack surface of the proof data, and eliminating the risk of leaking
private data at the source. Although some computations are added, the experimental results show that the time
overhead is within acceptable bounds.
Key words: integrity verification; cloud components; structural feature; privacy

1

Introduction

Nowadays, a significant part of our lives depends on
various cloud services. The beneficial characteristics
of the cloud service paradigm, e.g., low cost,
fast deployment, and high flexibility, facilitate its
wide adoption. Security is essential because of the
sensitivity of cloud data and resources. However,
due to the complexity of cloud architecture and
operations, security evaluation remains an ongoing
research objective[1] .
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Integrity verification is an important aspect of
securing cloud services. Integrity verification is able
to detect violations of software or predefined security
policies, and also play an integral role in many
other security techniques, such as remote attestation,
intrusion detection, and trust evaluation. Integrity
verification research has led to many improvements, but
security defects remain. Most existing solutions are
designed for stand-alone systems, performing a onetime verification of a single object. The cloud presents
a different situation with new challenges; a cloud
component usually contains multiple constituent parts
distributed on separate nodes and cooperating towards
the common function that the component is designed
to accomplish. For testing the integrity of a cloud
component, all of its constituent parts and dependencies
need to be evaluated.
There are two crucial points in the process of integrity
verification: the expression and checking of integrity
proofs, and the protection from tampering of these
proofs in storage and transmission. Many researchers
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have sought the clearest and most accurate forms of
proof that can describe the integrity status of an object;
for example, raw logs/records[2] , test reports[3] , process
contexts[4] , properties[5] , and Platform Configuration
Registers (PCRs)[6] . Forms of raw proof, such as
records and reports, can provide a solid basis for
integrity verification, but present the risk of leaking
private data. The direct use of informative proofs like
these creates a large attack surface which, if abused,
can reveal private details of the objects. Other proofs
are simple transformations, like properties and PCRs,
but the use of these does not eliminate privacy leakage
risks. With PCRs, platform configuration information
can be deduced with collision analysis[7] . The privacy
threats are further heightened in the cloud. Crossreferencing these proofs with data from other sources
(e.g., reports about vulnerabilities and patches) can
increase the amount of sensitive information that can
be derived about the cloud. Armed with these details,
further attacks can be initiated, such as locating victim
virtual machines[8] or finding the weakest link to inject
malicious codes[9] . Thus privacy issues with the cloud
components need to be considered in the integrity
verification.
The protection of integrity proofs is another research
focus. Representative schemes attempt to establish
dedicated secure channels for secure transmission.
These schemes are efficient when there is only one
object to be verified, but less efficient when the objects
are numerous and distributed on separate cloud nodes.
Building independent secure channels for each object
adds a heavy workload, causing a considerable latency
and degrading performance.
We therefore seek to balance proof protection
and performance in integrity verification in this
paper. Accordingly, we propose a Structural Integrity
Verification (SIV) approach for cloud components.
Analyzing the deployment and operations of structural
cloud components reveals an implicit behavioral
pattern, on the foundations of which we present
a structural feature to comprehensively express the
integrity status of all constituent parts of a cloud
component. The feature exists not only in raw proofs
but also in encrypted masked proofs, thus the SIV
approach is designed to enhance privacy in the integrity
verification of a structural cloud component. Our
contributions are summarized as follows:
(1) We present a structural feature to
comprehensively express the integrity of a cloud
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component. A cloud component is composed of many
constituent parts distributed on separate nodes; by
observing their deployment and operations, an implicit
behavioral pattern is detected. On the basis of this
pattern, the structural feature expresses the integrity
status of the cloud component in a collective way and
can further facilitate the integrity verification of all its
constituent parts in a batch.
(2) We put forward an effective integrity analysis
method that supports encrypted masked proofs.
Sensitive information is often carried in raw proofs,
such that their use may lead to the leakage of private
data. The structural feature presented in our paper is
present in both raw and masked proofs, therefore a
Third-Party Verification (TPV) service can analyze the
integrity of a cloud component based on encrypted
masked proofs. The raw proofs can remain on their
birth nodes, minimizing the attack service and helping
to preserving privacy.
(3) We begin to pave the way for verifying the
integrity of cloud components in a structural manner.
We hope our work can lead to similar evaluations of
different cloud environments and inspire more research
in the area.
Our paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews
the related work on integrity verification in cloud
environments. Section 3 discusses the challenges,
system model, and threat model in this paper. Section 4
states the preliminaries of cloud components and the
structural feature. The design of SIV is detailed in
Section 5, followed by a security analysis in Section 6
and a performance analysis in Section 7. Section 8 gives
the experimental results. We conclude the paper with a
discussion of limitations and potential future work in
Section 9.

2

Related Work

In general, an integrity verification process consists
of several procedures: proof generation, transmission,
processing, and analysis. During the whole process, the
two crucial points are the expression and protection of
proofs.
Raw forms of proof, such as logs, records, and
reports, are commonly used for integrity verification.
For example, Khan et al.[2] discussed using existing
forensic techniques with cloud logs to identify
malicious behaviors by attackers. Saibharath and
Geethakumari[3] collected virtual machine disk images,
logs, etc., to make a similar analysis. Tan et
al.[4] collected information on the dynamic running
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environment, including memory, processes, CPU,
network ports, disk files, and configuration data to
prepare for further trustworthiness evaluation. Watson
et al.[10] developed an online malware detection
approach in cloud computing infrastructures and
analyzed both system and network level data directly
obtained from virtual machines. However, such direct
use of informative raw proofs gives rise to the risk
of leakages of private data, as the details of objects
can be derived. Thus simple transformations of raw
proofs, like properties and PCRs, became popular. For
instance, Zhang and Lee[11] mapped the measurements
of virtual machines to security properties to monitor
their security health. PCRs are also classic proofs
used in Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) to
express the integrity of a platform, but the details of the
platform can still be exposed[12] . Leakage risks remain
with simple transformation techniques, and the issue is
even more serious in cloud environments. With detailed
raw proofs, the internal architecture and operating mode
of the cloud can be derived, making it easier for an
attacker to cause damage. Therefore the risks of leaking
private data in the verification of integrity proofs in
cloud components deserve special attention.
Protecting proofs remains a focus on the security
of storage and collection. In this context, trusted
hardware units (such as Trusted Platform Modules
(TPM)[13] , Intels Software Guard eXtensions (SGX)[14] ,
and ARM TrustZone[15] ) are commonly used. Sailer
et al.[6] secured all the measurements of executable
contents in TPMs. Perez et al.[16] presented a vTPM
solution, implementing TPM functions for virtual
machines. Chen et al.[17] presented a cloud-enhanced
design called cTPM to enable integrity verification
for mobile applications. Schuster et al.[18] employed
SGX processors to realize trustworthy data analytics
in isolated memory regions on nodes. Brito et al.[19]
leveraged TrustZone technology for secure image
processing. These hardware-assisted methods offer
good tamper-resistance for proofs, but again most
of them are designed for single systems. They are
efficient when there is only one object to be verified,
but less efficient when the objects are numerous
and distributed on separate cloud nodes. Building
independent secure channels for each object adds a
heavy workload, causing a considerable latency and
degrading performance. A balance needs to be struck
between proof protection and performance in the
integrity verification of cloud components.

3
3.1

559

Model
Challenges

The deployment and operation of cloud components has
a distinctive characteristic, which is that the constituent
parts on separate nodes have identical dependent
subcomponents in general. This characteristic can assist
with the integrity verification of cloud components, as
will be illustrated in the next section. First, however,
we present the new challenges arising the privacy and
performance concerns surrounding proofs that were
discussed above:
(1) There is a conflict between the effectiveness
of verification and the preservation of privacy. From
the point view of enhancing the accountability and
credibility of integrity evaluation, the proofs should
be as meticulous and accurate as possible. But this
requirement comes into conflict with privacy concerns,
given that for any object, the more details that are
described, the more information will be revealed.
This problem is exacerbated in cloud environments,
in which not only will knowledge about the cloud
components be revealed, but additional information
about the cloud architecture and functionality can also
be derived. Thus there is a major challenge involved
in expressing the integrity status of a cloud component
effectively in a proof while upholding standards of
privacy preservation.
(2) There is a need to strike a balance between
strong protection of proofs and appropriate levels of
performance. The proofs are of great use for detecting
attack traces, making them a rather appealing target. In
existing solutions, individual protection measures are
applied to proofs as single objects, as in the case of
using a special secure channel for data transmission.
This provides a good level of secrecy and integrity, but
impedes the batch processing of proofs. For a cloud
component with many objects to be verified, protection
at the level of individual objects will add significant
workload and generate considerable latency. Therefore,
we seek a new integrity verification approach that can
deal with protected proofs in a batch and achieve
appropriate levels of performance.
3.2

System model

Due to the complexity of cloud service models (IaaS,
PaaS, and SaaS), professional skills are required to
verify the integrity of cloud components. With a lack
of necessary resources, it is extremely difficult for
individual users to achieve the goals of verification.
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A common architecture is to employ a neutral TPV
to accomplish the work[20–23] . To enhance universality,
our system model is built on this TPV architecture,
under which three types of entities are involved: Cloud
Service Users (CSU), Cloud Service Providers (CSP),
and TPVs. These are depicted in Fig. 1.
The three entities can be described as follows:
(1) Cloud Service Users (CSUs) are individuals or
organizations making use of cloud services. Their data
and applications are outsourced to the cloud. They
hope to obtain a fair integrity verification result from
an independent TPV to evaluate the trustworthiness of
cloud components related to the desired service.
(2) Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) include the
multiple parties that are involved in the deploying,
hosting, managing, and maintaining cloud components
to provide services to CSUs. We treat them here as a
single entity for simplicity.
(3) Third Party Verification (TPV) providers are
individuals or organizations with the professional
skills to execute the integrity verification of cloud
components. As with CSPs, there may be multiple
parties included in TPV, but we treat them here as a
single entity for simplicity.
The integrity of proofs directly impacts on the
fairness of verification results. But the proofs face
various threats, as described in the next section.
3.3

Assumptions

We are concerned with the privacy problem in existing
integrity verification of cloud components, which
comes from the direct use of raw proofs. Sensitive
information is contained in these data, and if the
proofs are accessed they can reveal details of cloud
components and their security status. An attacker can
use the raw proof data to identify the weakest links

among the cloud security measures and to launch
further targeted attacks.
Therefore security holes inside the cloud are outside
of the scope of this paper. We assume the proofs are
credible, and that they reflect the integrity status of an
object faithfully. Our focus is on risks emerging from
the TPV providers. Threats of abuse can arise from
malicious insiders; the TPV provider may apply data
mining or AI techniques to the integrity proofs, gaining
additional information and selling it for financial
benefit. Inevitably, there are infiltration attacks to
cloud nodes, like the VM escape. However, real-world
practice shows that though easy to gain control of one
or two cloud nodes, it is extremely difficult to gain the
most. The costs are enormous. The goal is almost
impossible[24] . Thus, we assume that some cloud nodes
might be compromised, but the spoilage percentage is
in a minority, less than 50%.
TPV providers can also conspire with the CSP to
generate inaccurate proofs and deliberately present
false integrity verification results to users. This is
risky behavior, however. If caught engaging in such
unfaithful acts the TPV providers reputation will be
damaged to the point that the costs will outweigh any
gains. Thus this type of attack is also not considered in
our research.
There are other threats, such as eavesdropping and
sabotage. They are similar to those faced by common
carriers. While they are not detailed here, these threats
are taken into consideration in our design. Wherever
they may come from, all attacks are following the basic
rules of mathematics. A message cannot be decrypted
without a correct key, neither can a signature be forged
in a strictly limited time.

4

Preliminaries

In this section, we first illustrate the concept of a cloud
component. We then present a structural feature based
on a pattern implicit in its deployment and mode of
operation. The proof is the basis for our SIV approach.
4.1

Fig. 1

System model.

Cloud component

The cloud component is a collective concept in this
paper. It refers to a set of dependent subcomponents
distributed on separate cloud nodes to cooperate on
a common function. Each group of subcomponents
on a node is regarded as a constituent part of
the cloud component. The KVM/Xen hypervisor for
virtualization, the Apache Hadoop framework for
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distributed processing, the OpenStack architecture
for cloud management, and the OpenSSL tool for
communications are four examples of this kind of cloud
component.
Generally, the dependent subcomponents of all
constituent parts tend to share the same names, codes,
and binaries. Sometimes even the configurations are
the same, when they are working for the same higherlevel cloud service. This is due to the need for quick
deployment and simple management of software. In
fact, for simplified sake, all constituent parts of a cloud
component tend to come from the same source code
repository. Especially due to the large scale adoption of
VM cloning techniques and automated deployment in
batches, this feature, which forms a realistic foundation
for our approach, is common among cloud computing
components.
Take the toolkit OpenSSL as an example. To support
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL) protocols, a cryptography library must
be installed on every cloud node. OpenSSL can then
be classified within the scope of cloud components as
defined in this paper. In the integrity verification of
OpenSSL, all of its constituent parts distributed on the
cloud nodes should also be validated. In this situation,
the individual verification method of single objects that
is offered by existing solutions is not appropriate; we
need an approach that executes integrity verification in
a batch.
4.2

Structural feature

Since the constituent parts of a cloud component tend
to be identical for the sake of simple deployment and
operation, their integrity measurements also tend to
be identical. An implicit pattern is concealed in the
measurements, and based on this we can extract a
structural feature to express the integrity of the cloud
component.
Again take the OpenSSL to illustrate. If all of the
cryptography libraries on cloud nodes match the source
taken from a trustworthy code repository selected by the
CSP, the cloud component OpenSSL is claimed to be
integral.
In an integrity verification, when the OpenSSL is
integral, the measurements of all constituent parts
(in this case, the separate cryptography libraries) are
identical. The equality pattern inside the measurements
can be used as a feature to make a judgement on the
integrity. If there are minor malicious nodes, violations
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to the equality pattern will be obvious, because when
a library has been tampered with, the measurements
will be different from others that are trustworthy. The
difference showing in the equality pattern between
an trustworthy and a compromised cloud component
could therefore be used as the proof to verify integrity.
Moreover, the constituent parts can be reviewed in a
batch. We call this a structural proof and design our
SIV approach on this basis.
We use only one metric, the measurements of
constituent parts, in our presentation of the SIV
approach for the sake of clarity; our SIV method
is extensible and additional metrics can be added to
increase the evaluation certainty.

5

Design

We present an SIV approach in this section. An
overview is given first, followed by details of the three
processes of proof organization, transformation, and
integrity judgement. We expect to achieve the goal of
raising a fair verification result with an enhanced level
of privacy and performance.
5.1

Overview

The SIV approach in a TPV-based verification model
is depicted in Fig. 2. There are three entities
involved: CSU, CSP, and TPV. A CSU initiates a
verification request. The TPV responds to the request
and cooperates with the CSP to deploy agents on
cloud nodes; the agents are responsible for the
proof collection work. The TPV analyzes the proofs
and raises results for the CSU. Our work makes
some changes to existing interactions. The purple
rectangle covers three processes: proof organization,
transformation, and analysis. They are the major
reforms, and make up the core of the SIV approach.
In SIV, both the organization and transformation of
proofs are done inside the cloud. A set of masked
proofs are sent to a TPV provider. A structural feature
is extracted from the proofs to make an integrity
judgement. By transforming raw proofs on the cloud
nodes where they were created, the details of the
verified objects can be concealed. This eliminates the
possibility of leaking private data at the source. Also the
use of the structural feature means that the constituent
parts, including many dependent subcomponents, of
a cloud component can be verified in a batch, which
enhances the performance of the SIV approach. The
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Fig. 2

Overview of SIV.

three processes in SIV are specified in the following
sections.
5.2

Proof organization

The function of a cloud component relies on the cooperation of all of its constituent parts on different
nodes. A constituent part often consists of many
dependent sub components, such as libraries or binary
executables. All of these sub components should be
considered in an integrity verification. Thus for a
constituent part on a node, a set of measurements is
usually generated to express its integrity.
We leverage a Merkle hash tree[25] to organize the
set of measurements for all subcomponents on a node.
Every value in the set is hashed using a one-way
cryptographic function. A hash value is arranged as a
leaf in the tree. Each pair of the leaves is hashed together
to derive an upper node. The process is repeated until
only one node remains, which is called the Merkle
root. Each measurement in the set relates to the integrity

Fig. 3

of a subcomponent. If one is tampered with, the
corresponding leaf will change, which will change the
hash of its upper node, and so on, eventually resulting in
a change to the Merkle root. Thus, with this root value
the comprehensive integrity status of a constituent part
can be rapidly determined.
We illustrate the application of a Merkle hash
tree on the measurements set through a constituent
part example of OpenSSL 0.9.8k on a Windows
system. It relies on two static libraries: libeay32.lib
and ssleay32.lib, and four dynamic ones: libeay32.dll,
libeasy32.lib, ssleay 32.dll, and ssleay32.lib[26] . A
Merkle tree is constructed as shown in Fig. 3, made
up of four layers. The hashes of the subcomponent
measurements are the six leaves on Layer 1 (H00 – H05
on L1). The second tree layer (L2) has an odd number
of hashes. Then, to complete the pair hashing process,
the last node (H12) is concatenated with itself to form a
new upper node in Layer 3 (L3). On merging it with the
other node (H20), the Merkle root (H30) can be derived.

A Merkle hash tree of an OpenSSL constituent part.
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For a constituent part of a cloud component on a
node, its measurements set is organized in this way to
get a Merkle root value. The root value is regarded
as a raw proof. The direct use of raw proofs may
bring leakage risks, and they need to be transformed
before transmission due to privacy concerns. This
transformation process is detailed in the next section.
5.3

Proof transformation

A Merkle root value reflects the comprehensive
integrity of a constituent part. If the part is unchanged
and honest, the root value will be fixed. This means
that, with repeated verifications, the frequent use of the
root value poses a major threat, leading to a higher
potential for successful forgery attacks. Besides which,
routine updating or upgrading operations on the cloud
component will give rise to uniform changes in the root
values of all constituent parts. Cross-referencing this
phenomenon with information from other sources, such
as the distribution of new component versions or reports
on vulnerabilities, allows for the derivation of further
details and thus constitutes a threat to cloud privacy. To
resolve this issue, we propose a proof transformation
process in this section.
We first prepare some notations. The cloud nodes
set is denoted as D D fD0 ; : : : ; Dn g; i2Œ0; n 1. The
total number of nodes is n. The identifier of a node
Di is Idi . The constituent part on node Di is denoted
as MRVi . A masked proof of the root value MMRVi
is produced after the transformation; this is the data
to be sent to the TPV provider. Each cloud node
uses a public-private key-pair .PLi ; SKi / to establish
identity; the TPV provider also uses a public-private
key-pair .PL t ; SK t / for the same purpose.
As depicted in Fig. 2, there are two parts to the
proof transformation process: message construction
and message encryption. In message construction, the
body, denoted as CPi , consists of five parts: a masked
proof MMRVi , a node identifier Idi , a random value
N , a timestamp T , and a data signature Sigi . The
MMRVi are cipher texts from a one-time encryption of
an MRVi . We use a symmetric algorithm SEC./ and
a randomly selected key Ksec provided by the CSP for
the encryption. The Idi represents the node identity
number; N is specified in the verification request from
the TPV provider, and T is the current time at the
moment when the message is constructed. The Sigi
is signed by the data source node and attached to the
end of the message. In one-time symmetric encryption
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the keys are known only to cloud nodes, and should be
changed with every verification. In this way, all raw
proofs are transformed inside the cloud and cannot be
accessed by any other parties, thereby cloud privacy
is preserved to its ultimate limit. Idi distinguishes the
data source, and N and T maintain data freshness. Sigi
prevents message counterfeiting and repudiation. For
message encryption, we use an asymmetric algorithm
AEC./. The key is PK t , the public key of the TPV
provider. After the asymmetric encryption, the final
output of the transformation is denoted as Mi . We
illustrate the proof transformation in Algorithm 1.
In proof transformation we use an asymmetric
algorithm to encrypt the clear data. Although
computation speed is lower than symmetric encryption,
the Merkle root MRVi is a hash value with a small and
constant size, so the cost is not excessive. When all of
the masked proofs have been transferred to the TPV,
we are ready for integrity judgement.
5.4

Integrity judgement

The process of integrity judgement has two phases.
In Phase 1 we use the structural feature extracted
from the masked proofs to make a preliminary
integrity judgement. If the cloud component proves
to be integral, the verification ends. If violations are
detected, a list of compromised constituent parts is
made and Phase 2 begins. In Phase 2 we drill down
into the compromised constituent parts to locate the
compromised subcomponents. Using this two-phase
judgement procedure, we can rapidly attain a finegrained integrity verification result.
When a masked proof message Mi arrives at the TPV
provider and is decrypted, the random value, timestamp,
and node signature are validated. If the message is valid,
the data MRVi is then arranged as the i -th element of a
Algorithm 1 Proof transformation
Input: A Merkle root value MRVi ; i2Œ0; n 1
Output: A message Mi ; i2Œ0; n 1
1: Select a symmetric encryption algorithm SEC./ and a onetime key Ksec by the CSP. They are known to all cloud nodes.
Thus for an MRVi , its masked proof is expressed as
MMRVi D SEC./Ksec .
2: Construct the message with the cipher texts MMRVi , the
node identifier Idi , the random value N , and the timestamp
T . It is expressed as
CPi D MMRVi kIdi kN kTi kSigi :
3: Encrypt and sign the message. It is expressed as
Mi D AEC./PK t .
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list denoted as SF D MMRVi ; i 2 Œ0; n 1. Phase 1
then begins in Algorithm 2.
We perform XOR operations on SF to verify whether
the structural feature is satisfied. A flag F is used to
represent the verification result. If F is true, an integral
proof will be raised; if F is false, a list of compromised
constituent parts is made and both the CSP and CSU are
informed.
In Phase 1, a two-dimensional calculation matrix
CM and a one-dimensional result matrix RM are
introduced. The former is used to save the binary XOR
operation values, and the latter is to intuitively show
the normalized results. If all of the values in RM
are zero, then all elements in the list SF are known
to be identical; we can then infer that all constituent
parts meet the equality pattern, the structural feature
Algorithm 2 Integrity judgement — Phase 1
Input: A list SF D MMRVi ; i2Œ0; n 1
Output: A flag F , and a set identifying the compromised
constituent parts C CP
1: Construct an n  n matrix CM and initiate all its values to
zero.
2: Walk the list SF , adopt an XOR operation between the
current element and the other ones. This is expressed as:
For x in rang Œ0; n 1
For y in range .x; n 1
SF Œx D MMRVx ; SF Œy D MMRVy
CM Œy; x D CM Œx; y D MMRVx ˚ MMRVy .
3: Compute the sum of each row in matrix CM . Arrange each
sum value in a one-dimensional result matrix RM . This is
expressed as:
For x in range Œ0; n 1
RM Œx D sum.CM.x//.
4: Normalize the matrix RM values into a section Œ0; 1. This
is expressed as:
For x in range Œ0; n 1
RM Œx=n D RM Œx.
5: Walk the values in matrix RM . If all values are zeros, the
cloud component is integral; and if they are not, there are
violations. This process is expresses as: Initialize an empty
questionable nodes set CCP.
Case 1:
For x in range Œ0; n 1
If all RM Œx DD 0, then F D True.
The cloud component is integral.
Case 2:
For x in range Œ0; n 1:
If RM Œx > 0:5, then add Idx to the CCP. F D False.
The integrity of the cloud component is violated.
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is satisfied, and therefore the integrity of the cloud
component is verified. If some values in RM are
not zero, then some elements in list SF are different,
and we can infer that the equality pattern is somehow
violated. According to our threat model the worst case
scenario would be that all compromised constituent
parts are tampered with in some way. When the XOR is
used to compare the masked proof from compromised
parts with that of trustworthy parts in list SF, “1” is
placed in CM. Since the compromised parts are in the
minority, the ones in a CM row will be in the majority.
In RM a normalized value greater than 0.5 will point
to a compromised constituent part. This forms the basis
of our judgement in Phase 1. When there are violations,
the second phase begins. This is a targeted verification
towards the compromised parts, with the aim of figuring
out the specific subcomponents of a part that have been
compromised. A set of compromised constituent parts
CCP has been devised in Phase 1. A known trustworthy
part is added to the set at the beginning of Phase 2, so it
can be used for contrast. Additional trustworthy nodes
can also be added; there is no upper limit to the number,
but one certain credible node is sufficient to establish a
baseline.
In this phase the assumption model discussed in
Section 3.3 is no longer valid that the compromised
cloud nodes are in a minority, so the structural feature
fails. However, using the masked proofs of all leaf
measurements for constituent parts in the set CCP, the
specific subcomponents that are compromised can be
accurately identified.
CCP is made up of p parts. One is Idz ; z 2
Œ0; p 1. The symbol z represents the node holding
the compromised part. The leaves on Idz are arranged
in a list Hz D H zd ; d 2 Œ0; q 1. A constituent
part has q subcomponents. The masked leaves in an Hz
are arranged in a list MHz D MHzd ; d 2 Œ0; q 1.
Therefore, all masked proofs collected in Phase 2 are
denoted as MHC CP D MHz D MHzd ; z 2 Œ0; p
1; d 2 Œ0; q 1. After making the judgements, all
compromised sub-components are recorded in a list,
denoted as QSS D Szd . Szd is a tuple .z; d / telling us
exactly which subcomponent of which constituent part
is compromised.
Phase 2 is also illustrated in Algorithm 3.
With the two-phase integrity judgement process,
a comprehensive status of cloud components can
be rapidly provided. When there are violations, all
compromised subcomponents can be located accurately.

Bo Zhao et al.: SIV: A Structural Integrity Verification Approach of Cloud Components with Enhanced Privacy
Algorithm 3 Integrity judgement — Phase 2
Input: CCP
Output: QSS
1: Select a known honest node randomly and add it to the CCP.
There are p nodes in total.
2: Execute the algorithm proof transformation on all leaf
measurements. This is expressed as:
For z in range Œ0; p 1
For d in range Œ0; q 1
MHzd D Proof Transformation Algorithm .Hzd /,
produce a set MHCCP D MHzd ; z 2 Œ0; p 1; d 2 Œ0; q 1.
3: Initialize a blank list QSS.
4: The node z0 is honest, its corresponding masked forms of
those leaves are used as contrast.
For z in range Œ1; p 1
For d in range Œ0; q 1
If MH0d DD MHzd , then continue.
Else add a tuple Szd D .z; d / into the QSS.
5: Identify the specific questionable subcomponents on
different nodes according to the identifiers in the list QSS.

Throughout the judgement, only masked proofs are
required by the TPV provider, with raw proofs
remaining where they were generated. In this way the
risk of leaking private data during integrity proofs is
significantly reduced. Furthermore, instead of verifying
the subcomponents as individual constituent parts, they
are evaluated in a batch, thereby greatly improving
the performance of verifying the integrity of cloud
components.

6

Security Analysis

Privacy preservation of a cloud component is a focus
of our SIV approach, but equally important are the
unforgeability of integrity proofs and the accuracy
of locating questionable subcomponents. Hence our
security analysis is reported from these three aspects:
privacy, unforgeability, and accuracy.
Property 1 (Cloud privacy) The TPV provider
can never derive any details from the masked proofs
other than the comprehensive integrity of a cloud
component, no matter how many times the verifications
are repeated.
Proof For a constituent part of a cloud component,
only a Merkle root value is produced after the
organization process to reflect the parts integrity. In
this way all of the measurements of subcomponents are
compressed into a hash value. The Merkle root is then
transformed into masked proofs-cipher texts generated
from one-time symmetric encryption algorithms. Other
than extracting the structural feature from the masked
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proofs for integrity judgement, the TPV provider has
no means for decrypting them, let alone deriving cloud
details. Besides which, the cipher texts are encrypted
with a randomly selected key by the CSP in every
verification. For a trustworthy constituent part the
masked proof changes in every verification. Cloud
privacy is thereby enhanced in our SIV approach, and
Property 1 is proved.

Property 2 (Unforgeability) A masked proof
coming from a trustworthy cloud node can never be
tampered with or forged maliciously.
Proof A masked proof data message is constructed
in the proof transformation process. To ensure
unforgeability, the message should be sensitive to any
violations and, if it is tampered with or forged, the TPV
should be able to easily identify the breach.
The messages containing masked proofs are
unforgeable. They are encrypted by an asymmetric
algorithm with the TPV providers public key PK t .
Provided that the TPV providers private key SK t
is secured, malicious nodes can never successfully
intercept, decrypt, intimate, forge or manipulate any
message to deceive the TPV provider. Forging a
message before encryption is also impossible, because
a random value N , specified in the initial verification
request, and a timestamp T are attached to the data
to ensure freshness. A signature Sigi issued from
its source node is also added to the data to ensure
authenticity. Provided that the nodes private key is
secured, the signatures are unforgeable. Thus, with
these guarantees, Property 2 is proved.

Property 3 (Accuracy) The SIV approach can
provide an accurate integrity verification result for a
cloud component. If it is integral, SIV can present
the proof; if it is not, SIV is able to specify exactly
what subcomponents of what constituent parts are
compromised.
Proof The TPV provider makes integrity judgements
on the masked proofs in a two-phase process. The
overall integrity is determined by satisfying a structural
feature extracted from the masked proofs. It is inherent
from an equality pattern arising from the deployment
and operation of the constituent parts of a cloud
component. A one-dimensional result matrix RM is
produced after Phase 1. If the cloud component is
integral, all values in RM are zeros, which serves
as the proof. If there are some violations, Phase 2
is initiated. A set of all compromised parts CCP is
prepared in Phase 1. A known trustworthy part is added
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to the CCP to serve as contrast. The measurements of all
the subcomponents of a constituent part are masked and
transmitted to the TPV provider in a new cycle. Those
masked values from the trustworthy part are used to
establish a baseline, with any differences from this
baseline added to the list QSS. We can then exactly
locate the compromised sub-components from QSS.
Hence Property 3 is proved.


7

Performance Analysis

This section analyzes the computation overhead and
proof data size of our SIV approach. We compare it with
two other common integrity verification approaches,
denoted as A1 and A2. A1 is from Ref. [6], which uses
raw measurements, while A2 is from Ref. [4], which
uses original reports. The symbols are the same as used
above. There are n nodes in a cloud, correspondingly
there are n constituent parts in a cloud component. Each
constituent part has q subcomponents. There are p 1
malicious nodes in the cloud; the proportion .p 1/=n
is less than 0.5.
7.1

Computation

The extra computations added by the SIV approach
stem from three processes: proof organization,
transformation, and integrity judgement. We define the
following notations for the operations: Hash denotes
one hash operation, SEnc denotes one symmetric
encryption, ASEnc denotes one asymmetric encryption,
Sig denotes one signature operation, X denotes one
XOR operation, SUM denotes one addition, SUB
denotes one subtraction, and DIV denotes one division.
The organization and transformation of proofs are
executed on each cloud node individually. Taking a
constituent part with q measurements, a Merkle tree is
constructed with overhead of n.q C 2q 1/Hash. For
a component with p 1 compromised parts, the proof
transformation is executed in two rounds. In Round 1
only a Merkle root is transformed, with computation
overhead of SEnc C ASEnc C Sig. In Round 2 all
Merkle tree leaves are transformed, with overhead of
.p 1/.SEnc C ASEnc C Sig/. The total computation
for transformation is then .n C p 1/.SEnc C ASEnc C
Table 1

SIV
A1 and A2

Sig/. If we produce a signature with an asymmetric
algorithm, the computation will be .n C p 1/.SEnc C
2ASEnc/. The integrity judgement of the TPV includes
two phases; in Phase 1 the computation is n.nX C
SUM C DIV C SUB/, and in Phase 2 it is .p 1/.qX/.
The total computation is then n.nX C SUM C DIV C
SUB/ C .p 1/.qX /.
In the A1 approach all measurements are transmitted
to the TPV provider. A common means of security
protection is to negotiate a symmetric key for
encryption, in which case the computation would
be denoted as n.qSEnc C 2ASEnc/. The values are
inspected individually against the prepared baselines.
The integrity verification computation is n.qSUB/.
In the A2 approach the verification follows a similar
method and the differences are in the size of proof data,
which does not affect the computation. A comparison of
computation overhead and complexity of A1, A2, and
SIV is shown in Table 1.
From Table 1 we see that the complexity of SIV
is O.n2 /, and that of both A1 and A2 are O.nq/.
The SIV approach has a higher computation overhead
and complexity, but the reduction of proof data size
balances the time overhead. Moreover, the cloud bears
part of the proof processing, which is easy for it to
handle considering the high levels of cloud computing
power. This considered, and in view of the urgent
need to preserve privacy, the increased computation is
acceptable.
7.2

Proof data size

The SIV approach makes primary use of masked proofs.
We define the following notations for illustration. The
hash function used to generate the raw measurements
of subcomponents is denoted as HASH1 , and the hash
value size is l1 (Bytes). The hash function used to
generate the Merkle tree is denoted as HASH2 , and the
hash value size is l2 (Bytes). It follows that in the
integrity judgement process, the size of a masked proof
for a constituent part in Phase 1 is l1 , and that of a
masked proof for a compromised part is ql1 . For a cloud
the proof data size is nl2 C .p 1/ql1 . When l1 D l2 ,
the size is .n C pq q/l1 .

Comparison of computation.
Computation overhead

Cloud
Proof organization
Proof transformation
n.3q 1/Hash
.n C p 1/.SEnc C 2ASEnc/
n.qSEnc C 2ASEnc/

TPV
Integrity judgement
n.nX C SUM C DIV C SUB/ C .p
n.qSUB/

Complexity
O.n2 /
1/.qX/
O.nq/
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In A1 the proofs are raw measurements, and the data
size is nql1 . In A2 the proofs are original reports; if the
size of a report is denoted as c (KB), then the proof data
size is nqc.
A comparison of the proof data sizes of A1, A2, and
SIV is shown in Table 2.
The unit of hash values is generally Byte, whereas
reports is KB due to the presence of natural
language. Since the difference is of several orders of
magnitude, proof data size is reduced greatly, even
though SIV adds computations to both the cloud and the
TPV provision. This means that the overall performance
is balanced out, or even improved, as discussed in the
following section.

8

Experiments

8.1

Setup

We test the SIV approach on three datasets: D1, D2, and
D3. D1 is a small set of raw measurements collected
from a private cloud. It has nine subsets (S1 – S9). The
cloud is built on multiple VMs, which are used as nodes
and host the constituent parts of a component. The cloud
runs on three computers, the hardware and software
details of which are shown in Table 3. Limited by
physical resources, the number of VMs ranges in [6, 30]
with a step of six. D2 is a large set of raw measurements.
It simulates clouds with different numbers of total
and malicious nodes, controlled artificially for research
purposes. It has twelve subsets (S10 – S21). D3 is
a set of cloud components with different numbers
of subcomponents. It has one subset S22 with a
component P1 and 23 simulative elements. The number
of subcomponents numbers is changed artificially for
Table 2
SIV
A1
A2

Computer
C1
C2
C3

fine-grained research. D1 and D2 are presented in Table
4, and D3 is presented in Table 5.
The three computers shown in Table 1 are also used as
cloud nodes and TPV providers alternately to perform
the tests. The VMs are suspended after the generation
of measurements, so as to reduce the impact of SIV
evaluation.
We choose a common communication tool, OpenSSL
0.9.8zg[27] , as the component to be verified in our
experiments, because it is one of the most popular
software applications in cloud setups. The hash function
used in SIV is SHA256; the symmetric algorithm
is AES128, and the asymmetric algorithm is RSA.
The programming language is Python 2.7.13[28] . The
experimental results follow.
8.2

We first describe the experimental setup used to
evaluate the SIV approach, and then present the results
of our effectiveness and performance evaluations.

Comparison of proof data size.
Proof data size
Unit
.n C pq q/l1
Byte
nql1
Byte
nqc
KB
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Effectiveness

To evaluate the effectiveness of SIV we focus on
whether it can accurately raise an integrity verification
result and locate the compromised subcomponents. The
tests are performed on computer C1 with subsets S1 –
S9. The first five tests are to demonstrate how SIV
works, while the last four are to test the accuracy. The
experimental results for integrity verification are shown
in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 4 we use an arrow with two properties,
direction and color, to represent the values in a
result matrix RM . Figures 4a – 4e demonstrate the
appearance of the structural feature in the first five
subsets with all trustworthy nodes. When all of the
constituent parts making up OpenSSL are integral, their
masked proofs will satisfy the structural feature, and
the arrows corresponding to the values in RM will
have the same direction and color. Figures 4f – 4j show
violations of malicious nodes. Taking Fig. 4f as an
example, there are two malicious and 28 trustworthy
nodes in the cloud. We therefore see that there are
two arrows with a different direction and color from
the others, meaning that the structural feature has been
violated. The abnormal arrows accurately specify the
compromised nodes. In Figs. 4f – 4h the compromised
constituent parts are tampered with in the same way,
thus the direction and color of the abnormal arrows

Table 3 Hardware and software information of three computers.
Hardware and software information
CPU Intel(R) Pentium G3250@3.20 GHz, 4 GB RAM, OS OSX 10.9.5.
CPU Intel(R) XeonE5-2603v4@1.70 GHz, 64 GB RAM, OS Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS.
CPU Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700HQ @2.60 GHz, 16 GB, OS Windows 10.
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Dataset

D1

D2

Subset
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
S7
S8
S9
S10
S11
S12
S13
S14
S15
S16
S17
S18
S19
S20
S21

N
6
12
18
24
30
30
30
30
30
100
1000
5000
10 000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
3000
5000
7000

Table 4 Comparison of computation.
MP
Description

0

All nodes are honest. This is to demonstrate how SIV works.

1/15
1/5
2/5
2/3

There are malicious nodes in private cloud. The proportions are 1/15, 1/5, 2/5,
and 2/3. This is to test the accuracy of SIV.

0

All nodes are honest. This is to test the performance of SIV on different sizes
of proofs.

0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4

There are malicious nodes. This is to test the performance of SIV on different
malicious nodes proportions.

There are malicious nodes. This is to test the performance of SIV on both
different sizes of proofs and malicious nodes proportions.

Table 5
Dataset

Subset

D3

S22

Cloud component
P1: OpenssL0.9.8zg
X0
X1
X2
X3
X4–X22

Information of dataset 3.
SN
Description
6
The P1 is on windows system.
10
30
The subcomponents numbers (SNs) are controlled artificially.
70
120
200–2000
The SNs are changing in range [200, 2000], the step is 100.

are alike. In Fig. 4i, there are two attackers and the
compromised constituent parts are tampered with in
two different ways, so the direction and color of
the abnormal arrows are different (shown as red and
grey). In these cases where there is a minority of
malicious nodes, our SIV approach can accurately raise
an integrity verification result. However, the threat
model is invalidated and the structural feature fails
when the malicious nodes are in the majority, as shown
in Fig. 4g where two-thirds of the nodes are malicious.
The assumption that the majority of arrows represent
trustworthy nodes does not hold in such cases. When
all the constituent parts are tampered with in the same
way, the masked proofs from the malicious nodes will
form their own structural feature, confusing our SIV
into establishing an erroneous baseline and leading to
inaccurate integrity judgement results.
After the preliminary verification in Phase 1, Phase

2 works to specify exactly which subcomponents are
compromised. In essence it is same as the classic
determinations with raw measurements, but makes use
of the masked proofs.
In the entire integrity verification process, none of the
raw measurements have left their original places. This
minimizes the attack surfaces of proofs, and eliminates
the risk of leaking of private data at the source. At the
same time, the accuracy of verification is guaranteed.
Therefore SIV is effective and offers enhanced privacy.
8.3

Performance

To evaluate performance we focus on the time overhead
of the three processes of the SIV approach. Performing
tests on proof subsets S10 – S22, we examine how
different parameter values (number of subcomponents,
key length, hash functions, number of nodes, and
proportion of malicious nodes) effect the time overhead.
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(j)

Fig. 4

Integrity verification results of SIV on proof subsets S1 – S9.

The tests are conducted on the three computers
described in Table 3 as C1, C2, and C3, with the
results represented on histograms in red, green, and
blue, respectively. The unit of computation time is
microseconds.

The first test studies the time overhead involved
in executing a proof organization process. The major
time-consuming procedure therein is computing the
Merkle root value for all raw measurements of
subcomponents. There are two possible influencing
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factors: the computational ability of the cloud nodes
and the Subcomponents Number (SN). The process
is executed on each node individually, with the three
computers C1, C2, and C3 working as nodes. The test
is performed on subset S22. All of the hash functions
used in this process are SHA-256. The experimental
results are shown in Fig. 5.
The time overhead is inversely proportional to the
computational ability of the cloud nodes. From the
hardware information we know that C1 is the most
powerful computer and C2 is the least. Accordingly,
from Fig. 5 we observe that in most cases (X7 – X17,
and X19), C1 takes the shortest time and C2 the longest.
But in the cases of P1 – X6, X18, and X20 – X22, C1 or
C3 takes the longest, because although we have tried
to minimize concurrent tasks on nodes, they cannot be
eliminated entirely and thus can still effect the time
overhead. The first influencing factor is thus proved
with close relevancy.
The time overhead is proportional to the number of
subcomponents SN , but the growth rate is relatively
low. From Fig. 5 we can observe that when SN changes
from 6 to 2000, the execution time on C1 increases
from 0.46 ms to 10.14 ms. This represents a small

Fig. 5

(a) RSA key length = 1024 bits

maximum difference of 9.68 ms. We can thus conclude
that although the SN does have an effect on the time
overhead of proof organization, it makes only a small
impact. The second influencing factor is thus proved
with small relevancy.
The second test studies the time overhead involved
in executing a proof transformation process. The
major time-consuming procedures are the signature
and symmetric encryption. There are three possible
influencing factors: the computational ability of the
cloud nodes, the hash types used in the signature, and
the key length used in asymmetric encryption. The
process is executed on each cloud node individually,
with the three computers C1, C2, and C3 worked as
cloud nodes. We use five types of hash functions for
the signature: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and
SHA-512, and three types of key length for asymmetric
encryptions: 1024 bits, 2048 bits, and 4096 bits. The
asymmetric algorithm is RSA. We encrypt the Merkle
root value with a symmetric AES128 algorithm; the key
is randomly generated each time and the length is 16
bits. The experimental results are shown in Fig. 6.
The time overhead is inversely proportional to the
computational ability of the cloud nodes. From Figs.

Time overhead of proof organization.

(b) RSA key length = 2048 bits

Fig. 6

Time overhead of proof transformation.

(c) RSA key length = 4096 bits
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6b and 6c we can observe that C1 takes the shortest
time and C2 takes the longest. The relationship is not
entirely consistent, as seen in Fig. 6a where C1 takes
longer than C3 to perform some of the hash functions
for the signature. Time overhead is generally not highly
relevant to the hash types used for the signature. From
Fig. 6b we observe that the time overhead of the five
types of hash functions is relatively stable when the
public keys used in the RSA algorithm have a same
length of 1024 bits. Although the fluctuations on C1
are obvious, this only represents a small maximum
difference in value of 3.62 ms. The second influencing
factor is thus proved with little relevancy.
The time overhead is proportional to the key length
used in asymmetric encryption. From Fig. 6 we observe
that when the hash type is MD5 and the node is C1, the
durations are 8.92 ms, 31.51 ms, and 208.69 ms for key
lengths 1024 bits, 2048 bits, and 4096 bits, respectively.
The third influencing factor is thus proved with close
relevancy.
The third test studies the time overhead involved
in executing an integrity judgment process. The major
time-consuming procedure is the calculation of masked
proofs. The process is executed on a TPV provider.
There are three possible influencing factors: the
computational ability of the TPV provider, the number
of nodes in the cloud (N ), and the proportion of
malicious nodes (MP). The three computers C1, C2,
and C3 are worked as TPV providers. The tests are
performed on proof subsets S10 – S21. We control the
values of N and MP artificially to make comparisons.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 7. The time
overhead is inversely proportional to the computation
ability of cloud nodes. From Fig. 7 we observe little
interference in this group of tests. The first factor is
again proved with close relevancy to time.
The time overhead is proportional to the number of
nodes N . From Fig. 7a we observe that on C1, when
N is 100, 1000, 5000, and 10 000, with a zero MP,

(a) N changes with fixed MP

the durations are 2.38 ms, 234.92 ms, 5575.92 ms, and
22 334.79 ms, respectively. The time overhead shows
large increases by four orders of magnitude. The second
factor is thus proved with close relevancy.
The time overhead is not highly relevant to the
proportion of malicious nodes MP. From Fig. 7b we
observe that on C1, when MP is 0.1 ms, 0.2 ms, 0.3 ms,
and 0.4 ms, with a fixed N of 1000, the durations
are 221.89 ms, 229.51 ms, 227.48 ms, and 227.61 ms,
respectively. There is a small maximum difference in
value of 7.62 ms. The third influencing factor is thus
proved with little relevancy. Figure 7c confirms the
relevancy of N and MP; when both N and MP are
increasing, the variation trend of time overhead is
similar to Fig. 7a.
By observing the execution time of the three
processes, we learn that the third is the longest of
the three processes in the SIV approach. The time
overheads of the first two are in the tens or hundreds
of microseconds, but that of the third is generally in
the hundreds or thousands of microseconds. Thus when
the cloud component and key functions in SIV have
been determined, the number of nodes will be the
predominant time factor.
8.4

Comparison

From the performance analysis presented in Section 7
we know that the SIV approach introduces additional
computational overhead to enhance privacy. But it
also features reductions in proof data size, which
might balance out the performance hit. To study
whether there are net performance improvements,
we perform a quantitative comparison between SIV
and two common approaches (A1 and A2) for the
aforementioned cloud component[29] . In A1 the proofs
are raw measurements. We use an SHA-256 hash
function to generate these, thus the size of a raw proof
is 256 bits (32 Bytes). In A2 the proofs are original
reports. We use a set of reports generated by a popular

(b) MP changes with fixed N

Fig. 7
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Time overhead of integrity judgement.

(c) Both N and MP change
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integrity analysis software Tripwire 2.4[30] , and in our
configuration the size of each proof is 2.96 KB. For
a cloud component with 30 subcomponents and 1000
nodes, the proof data sizes of the three approaches are
compared in Table 6.
From Table 6 we observe that the proof data size in
SIV is much smaller than A1 and A2. This is a result
of the proofs being organized and transformed on cloud
nodes.
We also reconstruct the integrity verification process
of A1 and A2 to compare the time overhead of the
three approaches. Along with SIV, they are executed on
cloud components with 6, 30, and 100 subcomponents
involving 1000 and 5000 nodes to measure the overall
time overhead. The computing node is C1. The time
overheads are listed in Table 7.
From Table 7 we observe that the time overhead
of SIV is moderate. For a specific cloud component
it takes more time than A1 but less than A2. For
a cloud component with 300 subcomponents and
5000 nodes, SIV can produce the verification result
in about 13 seconds. Compared to A1 the time
latency is about 10 seconds, which remains in an
acceptable range. Here we only count the computation
time, ignoring communication time. In practice, when
the communication time is taken into account, the
SIV approach will achieve comparatively greater
performance, benefiting from the smaller proof data
size. SIV eliminates the leaking of private data at the
source by transferring only masked proofs, instead of
raw proofs, out of the cloud. Therefore taking into
consideration the reduction in proof size, the moderate
increment in time overhead and its ability to preserve
privacy, SIV outperforms the two common approaches.
Table 6
SIV
A1
A2

Proof data size of three approaches.
Initial generation
Transmission
32 Byte301000 = 960 KB
32 KB
32 Byte301000 = 960 KB
960 KB
2.96 KB301000 = 88.8 MB
88.8 MB

Table 7
N

1000

5000

SN
30
100
300
30
100
300

Time overhead of three approaches.
Time overhead
SIV
A1
1069.240
58.449
1218.220
185.225
1921.794
557.009
5774.254
314.676
6863.079
961.278
12 633.987
2823.496

(ms)

A2
2092.191
6902.697
20 955.167
10 073.417
35 794.461
106 213.788
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Conclusion

The problems of proof expression and protection have
been well studied in existing integrity verification
approaches. But the private data leakage risks
and degradation in performance involved with the
verification of a cloud component have not drawn
sufficient attention. To address this issue, we first raise
the challenges involved in verifying the integrity of
cloud components, and present our system model and
threat model. We then describe the cloud components
and its structural feature. On this basis we present
an SIV approach, which includes three processes:
proof organization, proof transformation, and integrity
judgement. By organizing all of the raw measurements
of subcomponents on a node using a Merkle tree
method, a root value is computed to represent the
comprehensive integrity of a constituent part of a
cloud component. This Merkle root is masked in
the subsequent proof transformation process. Collision
analysis is prevented with a one-time symmetric
encryption, and the masked proofs are transferred
securely with a TPV public key-based asymmetric
encryption. Since the size of the Merkle root is small
and constant, the asymmetric encryption time is within
a sensible range. From a set of masked proofs from
the cloud, a structural feature can be extracted. The
feature is validated in the first phase of the integrity
judgement process to raise a verification result. A onedimensional result matrix RM is the output. If the cloud
component is integral, the RM could be used as a proof;
if it is not, the compromised constituent parts can be
accurately located within the RM. In the second phase
of integrity judgement a further point of verification
can be initiated to precisely locate the compromised
subcomponents in a compromised constituent part. We
evaluated the effectiveness and performance of SIV on
three datasets, and the experimental results show that
the approach has merit. Throughout the process, the
raw proofs never leave their original places; only onetime masked proofs are transferred. This minimizes the
proof attack surfaces, and eliminates the risk of leaking
private data at the source. Although some additional
computations are involved, there is a major reduction
of proof data size, which balances out the performance
hit. SIV thus achieves the goal of verifying the integrity
of cloud components with enhanced privacy and good
performance.
There are some limitations to our work. SIV makes a
necessary assumption that the proportion of malicious
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nodes must be less than 0.5. When this assumption
fails, SIV is invalid. In addition, the structural feature
only exists in cloud components that feature identical
constituent parts on separate nodes. When the parts are
different, SIV is invalid. In future work, we hope to find
solutions to these limitations. We see our work as a first
step, paving the way towards protecting cloud privacy
in integrity verification. We expect such a work can
allow for more meaningful security analysis of existing
techniques and will inspire new research in the area.
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